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Abstract
Background: In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. The subsequent number, rates, and
causes of mortality in Iraq resulting from the war remain unclear, despite intense international
attention. Understanding mortality estimates from modern warfare, where the majority of
casualties are civilian, is of critical importance for public health and protection afforded under
international humanitarian law. We aimed to review the studies, reports and counts on Iraqi deaths
since the start of the war and assessed their methodological quality and results.
Methods: We performed a systematic search of 15 electronic databases from inception to January
2008. In addition, we conducted a non-structured search of 3 other databases, reviewed study
reference lists and contacted subject matter experts. We included studies that provided estimates
of Iraqi deaths based on primary research over a reported period of time since the invasion. We
excluded studies that summarized mortality estimates and combined non-fatal injuries and also
studies of specific sub-populations, e.g. under-5 mortality. We calculated crude and cause-specific
mortality rates attributable to violence and average deaths per day for each study, where not
already provided.
Results: Thirteen studies met the eligibility criteria. The studies used a wide range of
methodologies, varying from sentinel-data collection to population-based surveys. Studies assessed
as the highest quality, those using population-based methods, yielded the highest estimates.
Average deaths per day ranged from 48 to 759. The cause-specific mortality rates attributable to
violence ranged from 0.64 to 10.25 per 1,000 per year.
Conclusion: Our review indicates that, despite varying estimates, the mortality burden of the war
and its sequelae on Iraq is large. The use of established epidemiological methods is rare. This review
illustrates the pressing need to promote sound epidemiologic approaches to determining mortality
estimates and to establish guidelines for policy-makers, the media and the public on how to
interpret these estimates.
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On March 20, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. In
November 2002, four months prior to the invasion,
MedAct published a report projecting that a US military
offensive against Iraq could have enormous public health
impacts in the short-, medium- and long-term [1]. The
report estimated that the immediate, direct conflict-
related casualties could, within only months of the start of
a conventional war, range from 48,716 to 261,100 for
Iraqi civilians, combatants and coalition forces combined,
excluding the resultant indirect casualties and the possi-
bility of a civil war.
In April 2003, the coalition forces removed Hussein's
regime from power and US President Bush announced
that major combat operations had ended [2]. As Hussein's
Baath Party continued to disintegrate in the summer of
2003, the nature of the conflict began to shift. Although
the U.S. declared major combat operations completed,
insurgents continue to battle the coalition occupying
forces using asymmetric warfare and guerilla tactics.
More than four years following the declaration that major
combat operations had ended, violence in Iraq continues.
Sectarian and insurgent attacks are responsible for the
majority of current violence. Most attacks target civilians
on the basis of their ethnicity or religion, or perceived
affiliation with the new Iraqi government or occupying
forces. The United Nations has stated that Iraq is on the
brink of civil war [3].
Determining the total number of deaths resulting directly
and indirectly from armed conflict is challenging. The war
has caused the destruction of much of the health infra-
structure and health information systems in Iraq, systems
already weakened by UN sanctions in the decade prior [4].
As a result, attempts to determine the total number of
Iraqi deaths have proved particularly problematic [5,6].
Iraqi government ministries, non-government organiza-
tions, academic institutions and media reporting agencies
have attempted to estimate the total war-related deaths.
The methods used to determine mortality have varied
and, as a result, the mortality estimates are widely diver-
gent. We critically examined the existing studies estimat-
ing the extent of Iraqi deaths and reviewed their
methodological quality. We aimed to provide estimates of
total mortality, average deaths per day, along with crude
and cause-specific mortality rates attributable to violence.
As a result, we chose a broad scope for the data abstrac-
tion.
Methods
Search strategy
We (CT, EJM, HA) conducted a systematic search of the
following electronic databases from inception to January
2008: Allied and Complementary Medicine Database
(AMED), Cumulative Index to Nursing & Allied Health
Literature (CINAHL), Cochrane Library and Cochrane
Central, Excerpta Medica (EMBASE), MedLine, Education
Resources Information Center (ERIC), HealthStar, Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality – all through Ovid,
Web of Science, and the United Nations websites (UNDP,
UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO). We had no language
restrictions and also specifically searched in Arabic. The
key search term used was "Iraq". Where the volume of
studies and reports produced was unmanageable, addi-
tional limits were set by adding the terms "casualties or
deaths or mortality or civilian."
Additionally, we (CT, EJM, HA) conducted a non-struc-
tured review of ReliefWeb, Google Scholar and Google,
recognizing the likelihood that investigators may have
conducted research that they did not publish in health sci-
ences information databases [7]. Detailed review of the
references listed in key studies and reports provided an
additional source of studies. Where unpublished reports
or data were referenced, key individuals provided further
information and access to these studies.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
We included studies and reports that assessed the total
number of Iraqi deaths since March 20, 2003, the start of
the war. Eligible studies incorporated Iraqi civilians and
non-combatants in the total mortality estimates and were
based on primary research done with the intent – either
wholly or in part – of determining mortality estimates;
studies that included combatants in addition to civilians
and non-combatants were also included. We included
unpublished primary research that was sufficiently
reported via media sources and where key data could be
extracted.
We excluded studies and reports that were limited to a
specific sub-population (i.e. children under 5 years); how-
ever, studies were included if estimates on a specific sub-
population were reported as a component of a larger total
population number. Studies that reported only 'casualties'
and did not separate out mortality estimates were
excluded, as casualty reports may also include injuries.
Reports of total mortality estimates which were included
as part of a separate data source were not included, to
reduce the possibility of duplicate reporting on the same
data set. However, where methodologies differed and
mortality estimates were not comparable, all studies were
included.Page 2 of 13
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Using a priori defined study characteristics, we (CT, EJM)
abstracted the following data from all studies: 1) date of
data collection; 2) time period for reported deaths; 3)
total number of deaths reported; 4) each of total combat-
ant deaths, total civilian/non-combatant deaths; and, 5)
cause-specific deaths attributable to violence, where avail-
able [Additional file 1]. In our review, 'mortality' refers to
death from any cause, whereas cause-specific mortality
confers the reported reasons for death, generally deaths
due to violence. Additionally, data abstracted for the pop-
ulation-based surveys included methods of sample selec-
tion, sample size and pre-war data comparisons. For other
studies, both published and unpublished, we also
extracted information on study type and data source.
Methodological Quality
There is a paucity of empirical evidence examining meth-
odological quality in mortality estimates. We recently
convened a methods workshop to determine recom-
mended quality indicators in mortality surveys [8]. These
methodological quality recommendations should only be
applied to population-based studies and address issues of
coverage, bias, completeness and accuracy. For the pur-
pose of this manuscript, we extracted data on the follow-
ing: a) whether the sample was sufficiently representative
of the underlying population affected by the conflict; b)
whether the population sampling avoided bias (i.e. was
the random sampling systematic or simple); c) whether
the response rate was reported; d) whether efforts were
made to confirm deaths; and, e) whether households were
revisited to confirm findings. Appendix 1 explains the
rationale behind these quality indicators.
Statistical Analysis
Given the heterogeneous methods and time periods
applied to estimating mortality, we did not pool the
included studies. Further, given the intense political inter-
est in the mortality estimates, we provided details from
each study. Where not already done by study authors, we
(CT, EJM) calculated crude mortality rates (CMRs) and
cause-specific mortality rates due to violence (VMRs) per
1,000 per year and average deaths per day based on the
total mortality figures presented and time periods refer-
enced in each study or report.
Mortality rates provide inferences on the average rate of
death among a population over a specific time period.
Where exact dates of birth and death events are not
known, mortality rates are typically calculated as (Total
number of deaths during period/Population alive at the end of
the period + half of deaths during period – half livebirths during
period) × (rate multiplier/analysis period in time units of
choice). The rate multiplier (e.g. 1,000 or 10,000 people)
and time unit (e.g. day, month, year) are chosen so as to
express the rate in convenient units (in emergencies, typi-
cally per 10,000 people per day; in this paper, per 1,000
people per year). Where CMRs and VMRs were not pro-
vided by study authors, we calculated mortality rates for
each study based on this formula, excluding livebirths as
they are unknown. Our population estimates are based on
the United Nations Development Program/Iraq Ministry
of Planning and Development Cooperation population
estimations for 2004. For all calculations we determined
the total number of days in the study periods. Where the
exact start and end date is either unknown or simply
implied, we assumed either start, end or mid-month pro-
jections, indicated using ().
Results
Search Findings
Our systematic review and non-structured search together
yielded a total of 19 relevant studies, surveys and reports
at first pass. Of these, 6 studies were sourced through the
systematic search and 13 through the non-structured
searches. One study proved ineligible because the research
objective was unrelated to determination of Iraqi deaths
[9]. A multiple indicators cluster survey was also excluded
because its findings were limited to infant and child mor-
tality [10]. A report from the US Department of Defense
[11] was removed as its estimates were sourced from other
databases and no information was provided on the meth-
odology; additionally, these figures are referenced in the
dataset for the Brookings Institution, a study included in
this review. In addition, a review done by the Los Angeles
Times [12] was excluded to reduce the possibility of dupli-
cate reporting, as it has been incorporated as a data source
for one of the broader studies included in this review [13].
Information recently released by the American Civil Liber-
ties Union was excluded because it was not a comprehen-
sive mortality study and only provided information on
fatalities that were reported to the US government for
compensatory claims [14]. Lastly, a poll conducted by D3
Systems was excluded because it included any physical
harms resulting from violence, not just deaths since the
start of the war [15]. Our completed review includes a
total of 13 studies.
Study Characteristics
The 13 studies that we included are separated into two
general categories: population-based studies and passive
reporting. The passive data is further sub-divided accord-
ing to whether they were published or unpublished (i.e.
referenced only by secondary sources, usually the media).
Tables 1, 2 and 3 [see Additional file 1] present study char-
acteristics under each categorization. Each of the studies
differed in terms of the mortality estimates, study popula-
tions, time period and research methodologies used, con-
tributing to a broad range of mortality rates.Page 3 of 13
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generally the duration of the 'war' as declared by the US
government, to ongoing figures updated monthly or
weekly. The study population ranged from only civilians/
non-combatants to both combatants and civilians/non-
combatants, included and excluded Kurdish regions, and
reported deaths due to violence or from all causes.
Study Quality
Only 5 studies clearly relied on a population-based
approach; all were retrospective household surveys [16-
20]. We found that all 5 studies provided appropriate
details on representative sampling and used broad cluster
sampling. All 5 studies reported on their methods of ran-
domization in sampling and all used systematic random
sampling to allocate clusters. All 5 studies reported on the
response rates of households. Two of the studies
attempted to ensure accuracy of the deaths by requesting
death certificates [16,18]. Finally, 1 study reported revisit-
ing households to confirm initial findings and found that
there was a discrepancy between initial under-5 deaths
reported and the larger number identified in the revisit
[17,21].
Individual Study Results
As there was a broad range of methodologies used, there
are similarly a broad range of daily death rates, CMR and
VMR totals. The average daily mortality rates ranged from
48 to 759, the Iraq Body Count (IBC) representing the
lowest estimate and the Opinion Research Business
(ORB) survey representing the highest. The cause-specific
MR attributable to violence ranged from 0.64 to 10.25,
with the IBC and ORB studies again representing each of
the limits. Table 4 [see Additional file 2] presents detailed
study outcomes.
Individual Studies
Below, we summarize the key details from each study, sep-
arated according to population-based studies and passive
reporting, and whether the data was published or unpub-
lished.
Population-based Studies
Roberts et al, 2004 (period of data collection March 20, 2003–
September (15), 2004) [16]
This cluster random-sample survey of households
throughout Iraq aimed to determine mortality of Iraqis
before and after the 2003 invasion. Thirty-three cluster
starting points were allocated among Governorates by
probability proportional to size (PPS). In the sampling
frame, adjacent Governorates (matched for pre-invasion
violence and economic development) were paired to
reduce travel time and the potential risk to study team
members. Thirty households were then selected within
each cluster. The starting household in the cluster was ran-
domly selected using a GPS navigation system; research
teams visited households adjacent to the starting house-
holds until a total of 30 were surveyed. Individuals were
included in the survey if they had been residents of the
household during the two preceding months. Research
teams included medical doctors, both male and female,
and all members spoke both English and Arabic. Each
household was asked for information on births, deaths
and visitors staying in the household for more than 2
months. This information was requested both for the
period before (January 2002 to March 2003) and after
(March 2003 to September 2004) the invasion. For
reported deaths, interviewers requested copies of death
certificates for two in each cluster, so as not to compro-
mise researcher safety, as persistence may have been inter-
preted suspiciously. Death certificates were produced in
81% of the cases requested.
A total of 33 clusters, 988 households and 7,868 residents
were chosen; five households refused to participate and in
those clusters with proper absentee records, 872 house-
holds were visited (64 absent). A cluster located in Falluja
yielded extremely high violent death rates, was considered
an outlier and thus conservatively excluded in many of the
analyses. The total mortality estimates include both civil-
ians and combatants for all causes. The study estimates
that there was an average of 98,000 excess deaths since the
invasion (95% CI, 8,000–194,000). Approximately 51%
were estimated to be attributable to violent causes, or 24%
if Falluja is excluded. Based on these figures, there are an
estimated 180 excess deaths per day (15–356). Study
authors reported a crude mortality rate post-invasion of
12.3 (95% CI, 1.4–23.2) per 1,000 population per year
over the entire study period, including Falluja, compared
with a pre-invasion rate of 5.0 (95% CI, 3.7–6.3). Exclud-
ing Falluja, the total crude mortality rate post-invasion
was 7.9 (95% CI, 5.6–10.2).
The Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004 (period of data collection 
March 20, 2004–May (31), 2004) [17]
The Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development Corpora-
tion, in partnership with the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP), commissioned a multi-indicator
household survey in 2004. The study was conducted by
the NGO FAFO. Interviewers administered two question-
naires: 1) to recognized head of households on issues
related to a variety of indicators, including housing and
infrastructure, household economy, basic demography,
and the education, health (including household deaths),
and labour force characteristics of the household mem-
bers; and, 2) to household women aged 15 to 45 on issues
related to reproductive and child health. The survey was
conducted in both Arabic and Kurdish. Although the sur-
vey was created in English, it was back-translated for veri-
fication. Authors estimated that the detailed survey tookPage 4 of 13
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mix and profession of those administering the question-
naire was not indicated.
The study was a multi-stage cluster sample survey. Cluster
starting points were allocated among Governorates using
a mixture of PPS and explicit stratification so as to provide
various stratum-specific estimates (e.g. by Governorate
and urban versus rural), based on population data from
census or local statistics offices. Ten households within
each cluster were then selected by segmentation (selection
by PPS of a sufficiently small population unit, exhaustive
listing of households in the unit, and systematic random
sampling within this list).
The results of the surveys were sent to the Governorate
office for registration and inspection, to Baghdad for cod-
ing, data entry and quality control, and then to FAFO's
headquarters in Norway for further quality reviews. Where
required, additional re-interviewing was conducted in the
field.
A total of 21,668 households were surveyed from across
Iraq, including all Kurdish areas. The total mortality esti-
mates include both civilians and combatants. The ILCS
estimates there were approximately 24,000 (95% CI,
18,000–29,000) war related deaths (presumably due to
violence) since March 2003, as determined by the number
of persons reported dead or missing in each of the house-
holds due to violent causes. Based on these figures, the
violent death rate is 54 per day (41–66) and the violent
mortality rate is 0.74 per 1,000 per year (95% CI, 0.55–
0.89). The study investigators found discrepancies with a
higher number of deaths reported when a sample of
households was revisited [21].
Burnham et al, 2006 (period of data collection March 20, 2003–July 
(15), 2006) [18,22]
This study was intended to update the mortality figures
reported by a previous study published in 2004 [16]. For
this study, researchers conducted a cluster random-sam-
ple survey of households throughout Iraq. Fifty clusters of
40 households, estimating 8 members per household,
were allocated among Iraq's Governorates using PPS. A
further stage of PPS sampling allocated clusters to admin-
istrative units within each Governorate. Within each
administrative unit, one main street and one residential
street crossing this main street were randomly selected,
and the starting household for the cluster selected ran-
domly among all households along this residential street.
Researcher teams then visited adjacent households until
40 households were surveyed. Individuals were included
in the survey if they had been residents of the household
during the three preceding months. Research teams were
comprised of trained medical doctors, both male and
female, who spoke both English and Arabic. Each house-
hold supplied information concerning births, deaths and
in/out migration before and after the invasion. Wherever
possible and where interviewer safety was not deemed to
be compromised, the cause of death and a copy of the
death certificate were requested for verification.
A total of 47 clusters, 1,849 households and 12,801 mem-
bers were included in the final data analysis; 3 clusters
were not completed due to miscommunication and other
security issues, and were excluded from the final sample.
Results were based on comparing the death rates in all
households surveyed for the period before invasion (Jan-
uary 2002 to March 2003) and in the period after (March
2003 to July 2006) to determine the total excess deaths
due to the war, meaning those deaths above the pre-inva-
sion rates. Mortality estimates include both civilians and
combatants for all causes. The study estimates that there
were 654,965 excess deaths since the invasion (95% CI,
392,979 to 942,636). Of these, 601,027 (95% CI,
426,369 to 793,663) were attributable to violent causes.
Based on these figures, there are an estimated 540 deaths
per day (95% CI, 324 – 777). Study authors reported a
crude mortality rate of 5.5 (95% CI, 4.3–7.1) in the period
pre-invasion, 13.2 (95% CI, 10.9–16.1) per 1,000 popu-
lation per year over the entire study period, and a rate of
19.8 (95% CI, 14.6–26.7) for the last year from June 2005
to June 2006. The overall cause-specific mortality rate due
to violence is 7.2 per 1,000 per year.
Opinion Research Business, 2007 (period of data collection March 
20, 2003–August (15), 2007) [19]
The British polling agency Opinion Research Business
(ORB), in partnership with their Iraqi fieldwork agency,
has been tracking opinion in Iraq since 2005 and con-
ducted a poll of the population in August 2007 to deter-
mine the impact of the ongoing conflict.
ORB used a multi-stage random probability sample in 15
of the 18 governorates to derive a representative sample of
1,720 households. Karbala and Al Anbar governorates
were excluded for security reasons and Irbil refused to
grant a permit to conduct the survey. 1,499 in the sample
agreed to respond to the question. The poll asked an adult
over the age of 18 in each household: "How many mem-
bers of your household, if any, have died as a result of the
conflict in Iraq since 2003 (i.e. as a result of violence
rather than a natural death such as old age)? Please note
that I mean those who were actually living under your
roof." The survey was conducted through face-to-face
interviews. No further information regarding the study
methods was provided.
Respondents replied by stating the number of individuals
in the household that have died due to violence sincePage 5 of 13
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two; 1% stated three; and, 0.002% stated four or more.
ORB based their total mortality calculations on the 2005
census information, which assumes that there are a total
of 4,050,597 households throughout Iraq. They estimate
that 1,220,580 [margin of error +/- 2.5% equals a range of
733,158–1,446,063] deaths due to violence have occurred
since March 2003. Based on these estimates, there are 759
deaths per day (range 456–899) and the violent mortality
rate is 10.25 per 1,000 per year (range 6.15–12.16).
Iraq Family Health Survey, 2008 (period of data collection March 20, 
2003–June (15), 2006) [20]
The Iraq Family Health Survey was conducted in 2006 and
2007 by federal and regional ministries in Iraq, and the
Central Organization for Statistics and Information Tech-
nology (COSIT), with technical support provided by the
World Health Organization. It was a cross-sectional,
nationally representative household survey that estimated
morbidity and mortality rates from January 2002 through
June 2006, for both pre- and post-invasion periods.
The study design was a two-stage stratified sample survey
of households. Excluding Baghdad, each of 17 of the 18
governorates in Iraq were divided into 3 sampling
domains; Baghdad was divided into 5 sampling domains,
for a total of 56 sampling domains in the survey. Each of
the 56 domains was further stratified into 18 clusters and
10 households were selected from each cluster using a lin-
ear random systematic sampling. The total target sample
was 10,080 households. However, cluster sizes in the
Baghdad-Karkh, Anbar and Nineveh domains were
increased to account for the liklihood that some clusters
would be inaccessible due to insecurity. Following this
increase, a total of 1,086 clusters and 10,860 households
were selected to be surveyed.
115 clusters in Anbar, Baghdad, Wasit and Nineveh were
not surveyed due to insecurity. Mortality estimates for
these areas were imputed using data from the Iraq Body
Count to determine the ratio of death rates relative to
other comparable high mortality provinces. Due to the
exclusion of these areas, 9,710 households were visited
and 9,345 interviews were conducted for a total response
rate of 96.2%. The interview teams were comprised of
both men and women and some of the female interview-
ers were doctors or other health professionals.
Three questionnaires, translated into both Arabic and
Kurdish, were administered to three different members of
each household regarding mental health, reproductive
health, and other general questions. Interviewers asked
for information on each household death that occurred
during the study period, including sex, age, time and place
of death, as well as the primary cause, as reported by the
respondent. Questionnaires and forms in each completed
cluster in the South/Centre of Iraq were sent to the Federal
Ministry of Health in Iraq for verification; incorrect or
incomplete forms were sent back to the respective gover-
norates. Data was double entered and verified. Death cer-
tificates were not requested for verification. Design
weights were calculated to adjust for different household
sampling selection probabilities as well as non-responses.
Crude and cause-specific mortality rates were calculated
by comparing the exposure times (to the nearest month)
to the risk of death for the living and deceased in each
household between for the pre-invasion period (January
2002 to February 2003) and post-invasion periods
(March 2003 to June 2006). Estimates for violent deaths
post-invasion accounted for survey sampling errors,
including adjusting for the missing clusters, underreport-
ing, and projected population figures due to migration.
There were a total of 61,636 people living in the house-
holds that were sampled. After adjusting for the rates in
excluded clusters, the crude death rate prior to the inva-
sion for all of Iraq was calculated to be 3.17 [95% CI,
2.70–3.75] per 1,000 person years; the rate post-invasion
was 6.01 [95% CI, 5.49–6.60] per 1,000 person years. The
cause-specific death rate due to violence was 0.10 [95%
CI, 0.04–0.32] and 1.09 [95% CI, 0.81–1.50] per 1,000
person years, respectively; however, after accounting for
sampling errors and adjusting for missing clusters, the rate
was projected to be 1.67 [95% CI, 1.24–2.30]. Authors
estimate that the number of deaths due to violence from
March 2003 through June 2006 is 151,000 [95% CI,
104,000 to 223,000]. Based on this, the number of vio-
lence-related deaths per day is approximately 126 [95%
CI, 87–186].
Passive reporting
Published Studies
Conetta C, Project on Defense Alternatives Research Methods 
(PDAR), 2003 (period of data collection March 19, 2003–May 1, 
2003) [13]
The PDAR conducted an analysis and synthesis of data
reported on Iraqi deaths, including journalistic surveys of
casualty incidents, hospitals, burial sites and graveyards
and battlefield eyewitness accounts from embedded jour-
nalists and military personnel. Totals are based on data
extrapolation for all of Iraq, based on the database of
compiled reports and incidents.
Civilian casualty data was generally compiled from media
surveys and reports, including those by the Associated
Press, Knight-Ridder and the Los Angeles Times and supple-
mented by NGO studies, such as the Campaign for Inno-
cent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), as well as other media
reports of casualty incidents based on eyewitness accountsPage 6 of 13
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the dead. Mortality estimates for combatants are derived
largely from embedded journalists and interviews with
military personnel on both sides and some estimates
based on artillery power projections. PDAR has reported
total figures for all deaths and those separately for both
non-combatant and combatants. The authors do not pro-
vide a specific time period; all estimates are for deaths that
occurred, generally, "during the war", presumably the
period from invasion to the official declaration by Presi-
dent Bush that combat had ceased (May 2003).
The PDAR estimates that a total of 12,950 Iraqis were
killed in the war (+/- 2,150 a range of 15,100–10,800). Of
these, 9,200 (+/- 1,600 a range of 10,800–7,600) were
combatants and 3,750 (+/- 500 a range of 4,250–3,250)
were non-combatants. However, PDAR has recognized
that in some cases there may be overlap and an inability
to distinguish precisely between combatant and non-
combatant deaths. Based on these figures, the total daily
death rate would be 308 per day (range, 287–360) with a
crude mortality of 4.15 per 1,000 per year (range, 3.46–
4.84); separated out, the rate for combatants would be
219 deaths per day (range, 181–257) with a crude mortal-
ity rate of 2.95 (range, 2.43–3.46) and non-combatants
89 deaths per day (range, 77–101) and a cause-specific
mortality rate due to violence of 1.20 (range, 1.04–1.36)
per 1,000 per year.
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), December 
2006 (period of data collection May 1, 2006–December 31, 2006) 
[23]
UNAMI is a centralised information sharing group which
supports the UN's continued involvement in Iraq follow-
ing the conclusion of the Oil for Food program.
The UNAMI Human Rights Office produces monthly
reports identifying a series of current and ongoing rights
violations as well as recommendations intended to miti-
gate the impacts. Included in these reports are total per-
period deaths. Mortality figures are determined by com-
bining the deaths reported by the Ministry of Health
(MOH) and the Medico-Legal Institute of Baghdad (M-
LIB). The MOH derives their reports from mortality fig-
ures received by all hospitals in Baghdad and other Gov-
ernorates, with the exception of Kurdistan. The M-LIB
totals are based on bodies brought to the morgue. The
reported totals are for civilian deaths only and are almost
entirely due to violence (with the exception of approxi-
mately 5–6% of the M-LIB figures).
UNAMI reported 25,847 total deaths in reports during the
period of May to December, 2006. Although reports are
also available from July 2005 to April 2006, they have
been excluded for purposes of this review due to gaps in
data and inconsistently reported methodology. In addi-
tion, the quarterly report for January to March 31, 2007,
states that the Iraqi Government declined to provide
access to the Ministry of Health's overall mortality esti-
mates for this period. Based on the total deaths reported
between May and December 2006, the number of deaths
per day is approximately 106 and the cause-specific mor-
tality rate attributable to violence is 1.42 per 1,000 per
year.
The Brookings Institution, January 2008 (period of data collection 
May, 2003–December (15), 2007 and January 16, 2008) [24]
The Brookings Institution (BI) is an independent research
organization that analyzes US national public policy
issues. The 'Iraq Index' report is prefaced by stating that,
generally, data is derived from the US government, NGOs
and media reports, with only a small amount of informa-
tion coming from Iraqi sources. Some of the data also
includes further models by the BI.
The military and police mortality data referenced the Iraq
Minister of the Interior, military personnel and media
reports as information sources. The total number of Iraqi
military and police deaths reported from June 2003 to
January 16, 2008 is 7,792.
Data for civilian deaths was based on figures provided by
the Iraq Body Count for the period from May 2003 to
December 2005. This data was increased by a factor of
1.75, to account for the difference in casualty estimates
noted between the IBC and Iraqi Ministry of the Interior
for this period. The Brookings Institution conducted a
separate study of the crime rate and estimated that
approximately 23,000 murders had occurred throughout
Iraq; the IBC and crime data were combined for a monthly
estimate from May 2003 to December 2005 (44, 265).
From the period of January 2006 to December 2006 mor-
tality figures from UNAMI were totaled (34,452). Esti-
mates for the period from January to December 2007 were
based on U.S. State Department Weekly Status Report,
September 12, 2007 and press briefings (18,300). The
entire period civilian mortality estimate is based on a sum
of these numbers and totals approximately 97,017.
Based on this information, the military and police daily
mortality rate was approximately 5 deaths per day with a
cause-specific MR due to violence of 0.06; the death rate
for civilians was 57 deaths per day and cause-specific MR
due to violence of 0.77 per 1,000 per year.
Iraq Body Count, January 2008 (period of data collection March 20, 
2003–January 17, 2008) [25]
The Iraq Body Count (IBC) is the source most often refer-
enced by coalition-forces politicians for Iraqi mortality
estimates [26]. The IBC maintains a publicly accessiblePage 7 of 13
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lawlessness resulting from the war, based on online sur-
veys and compilation of media-reported deaths. Totals are
based on mortality figures reported by online English lan-
guage media agencies, designated from a list that meets
IBC determined baseline standards and which are vali-
dated by at least two independently reported sources.
Where discordant figures are reported, a range of deaths is
provided by IBC. Although all figures are checked by two
IBC staff and the original compiler of the data, the accu-
racy ultimately relies both on deaths actually reported by
the media and on the rigor of the reporting agency. As
such, IBC has acknowledged that total figures reported are
likely underestimated [27].
As of mid-January 2008, the IBC reported an average of
84,333 Iraqi civilian deaths (range 80,621 to 88,044).
Based on this figure for approximately a 1,764 day period,
the average death rate would be estimated at 48 deaths per
day (range 46 to 50) and the cause-specific MR due to vio-
lence is 0.64 per 1,000 per year (range 0.61 to 0.67).
Just Foreign Policy, January 2008 (period of data collection March 
20, 2003–January 17, 2008) [28]
Just Foreign Policy (JFP) is an independent organization
that promotes reformation of U.S. foreign policy. The
group keeps an ongoing and continually updated record
of Iraqi civilian deaths due to the U.S. invasion, intended
to be a "daily rough estimate" and not a scientific study.
JFP estimates are based on a combination of the results of
the Burnham et al. study and the Iraq Body Count. Mor-
tality estimates are calculated according to the following
formula: [Burnham et. al estimate as of July 2006] ×
[(Current IBC Deaths)/(IBC Deaths as of July 1, 2006)] As
of mid-January, JFP projected that there were 1,168,058.
Based on this, there are approximately 662 deaths per day
and the mortality rate is 8.95 per 1,000 per year.
Unpublished Studies
The People's Kifah, 2003 (period of data collection March 20, 
2003–October (15), 2003) [29,30]
The People's Kifah, an Iraqi political organization, is
reported to have conducted a population-based study in
September and October 2003. Volunteers went into vil-
lages, towns and cities across Iraq in 14 Governorates,
excluding Kurdish areas, to collect death statistics and
information from individuals and hospitals. The survey
also included interviews with grave-diggers and other eye-
witness accounts. As the actual survey is unpublished, fig-
ures are derived from media reports on communications
and statements sourced from the organization's spokes-
man, Dr. Muhammad al-Obaidi [30]. Unfortunately, the
survey is reported to have discontinued due to the kidnap-
ping of one of the workers.
The People's Kifah reported 37,137 civilian deaths due to
violence during the seven months from March to October
2003. Therefore, the daily death rate is 177 and the cause-
specific MR due to violence is 2.39 per 1,000 per year.
Iraqiyun, 2005 (period of data collection March 20, 2003–July 11, 
2005) [31]
Iraqiyun is a humanitarian organization lead by Dr.
Hatim al-Alwani. The actual study produced by the organ-
ization is unpublished, therefore total deaths are based on
press reporting of statements made by al-Alwani which
have implied that the study may have been a population-
based study. Iraqiyun figures are based on reports from
hospitals across the country and information obtained
from relatives and families of the deceased.
On July 12, 2005, the organization reported that 128,000
Iraqis had died since the start of the war. Based on this fig-
ure, there are 152 deaths per day and a cause-specific mor-
tality rate due to violence of 2.03 per 1,000 per year.
Iraq Ministry of Health, 2006 (period of data collection March (20), 
2003–November (30), 2006) [32]
In November 2006, Iraqi Health Minister Ali al-Shamari
estimated that approximately 100,000–150,000 Iraqi's
had been violently killed since the start of the war. Minis-
try staff subsequently confirmed these figures.
Ministry totals are based on daily death counts reported at
hospitals across the country and morgues in the Baghdad
area, although no actual reports are published or publicly
available. The Ministry began collecting mortality data in
2004, so the total estimate is based on currently reported
daily death rates that have been extrapolated back to
March 2003. The figures include all deaths (combat/non-
combat) by violent causes. The reported daily death rate
ranges from 75 to 100 per day, with a total of 100,000 to
150,000 estimated total deaths since the start of the war
and a cause-specific MR due to violence of 1.01 to 1.34 per
1,000 per year.
Discussion
Estimating mortality during conflicts, such as the Iraq war,
presents important obstacles. Appropriate methods exist,
such as population-based methods of retrospective sur-
veys and community-based prospective surveillance, and
are widely available on the internet and medical literature
[27,33]. However, despite the availability of appropriate
and accepted methodologies, studies we reviewed here
used diverse methodologies and were of widely divergent
quality – some with major weaknesses, and, presumably
therefore resulting in differing estimates of mortality.
Nevertheless, the media frequently reports on these esti-
mates and they can have an important influence on the
political process and subsequent foreign policy decisionsPage 8 of 13
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ing that there is such a wide variance in their methods and
estimates.
We have systematically reviewed the literature to identify
all of the estimates of mortality and describe their meth-
odology to bring more transparency to this critical area of
epidemiology. Our review identified a total of 10 pub-
lished studies that included 5 population-based studies
[16-20] and 5 passive reporting studies [13,23-25,28].
Only 3 studies have been published in peer-reviewed
sources [16,18,20], although non-journal based publica-
tions may also hold to academic standards. We also iden-
tified 3 additional studies based on secondary reports
with no identifiable source document [29,31,32]. The
studies provided mortality estimates varying from 48
deaths per day to 759 deaths per day. Although daily
death rates and violent mortality rates have been calcu-
lated for each study, these figures should serve only as a
general framework because they obscure the methodolog-
ical differences in each study and surges of violence that
may occur at specific times. For example, some studies
limited mortality totals to civilians/non-combatants,
while others included combatants; some studies included
only violent deaths, others included deaths for all causes.
Some also excluded Kurdish areas of Iraq, while others did
not. In addition, the different methods for gathering data
each inherently have strengths and limitations that affect
the range, whether higher or lower, of mortality estimates
produced (See Appendix 2). There are, as yet, no tools to
critically appraise the quality of evidence from armed con-
flict studies and it is clear that there is a pressing need for
the development of appraisal checklists, and further con-
sideration of systematic reviews/meta-analyses of human-
itarian emergency data [34].
The two broad classes of data collection methods, popula-
tion-based and passive reporting, partly explain the vari-
ance in the estimates (See Appendix 2) [27]. The
population-based methods are well established and a gen-
erally accepted method within the fields of epidemiology
[27,33]. Studies using a population-based method are
more sensitive for estimating mortality, by identifying
non-reported deaths.
All of the 5 included studies [16-20] that used population-
based methods also used established methods to reduce
investigator-driven bias, including random sampling, a
priori sample size estimation, a priori specification of loca-
tions and PPS; four reported on sampling imprecision
through presentation of findings with confidence inter-
vals [16-18,20]; and, three attempted to acquire accuracy
of deaths [16-18]. Two of the population-based studies
requested death certificates to verify causes of death and
were successful in obtaining them in the vast majority of
reported deaths [16,18]. While such methods may yield
accurate estimates of national rates by sampling only a
small proportion of the population, this accuracy is criti-
cally dependent on the representativeness of the sample.
However, such methodologies are less specific in identify-
ing causes of death and may be susceptible to reporting
and sampling biases. This is most appropriately addressed
through the requests for death certificates. Compilation
from primary sources or passive reporting methods, that
rely upon media and/or official sources for mortality
information are likely to be more specific, however,
would be expected to considerably underestimate true
mortality by not capturing unreported deaths and indirect
deaths, from non-violent effects of war, for example, that
are not often attributed to the ongoing conflict [35].
Of the population-based studies, the Roberts and Burn-
ham studies provided the most rigorous methodology as
their primary outcome was mortality [16,18]. Their meth-
odology is similar to the consensus methods of the
SMART initiative, a series of methodological recommen-
dations for conducting research in humanitarian emer-
gencies [33]. Another population-based study, the Iraq
Living Conditions Survey, reported lower death estimates
that we assume is due to the survey being conducted
barely a year into the conflict, a higher baseline mortality
expectation, and differing responses to mortality when
houses were revisited [21]. However, not surprisingly
their studies have been roundly criticized given the polit-
ical consequences of their findings and the inherent secu-
rity and political problems of conducting this type of
research [36,37]. Some of these criticisms refer to the type
of sampling, duration of interviews, the potential for
reporting bias, the reliability of its pre-war estimates, and
a lack of reproducibility. The study authors have acknowl-
edged their study limitations and responded to these crit-
icisms in detail elsewhere [38]. They now also provide
their data for reanalysis to qualified groups for further
review, if requested.
Recently, a study published in the New England Journal of
Medicine estimates that there were approximately
151,000 violence-related deaths from March 2003 to June
2006. The authors estimate that the completeness in
reporting of deaths was 62% and that the underreporting
for violent deaths may be as much as 50%. In addition,
the authors did not indicate whether verification was
sought by requesting death certificates and there may be a
resistance of some household members to disclose cause
of death. In a previous study conducted by members of
the research group, household re-visits determined that
there was under-reporting in the under-5 mortality rate.
Of the passive surveillance studies the IBC study was, until
recently, the most frequently cited by media sources andPage 9 of 13
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lished as an activist response to US refusals to conduct
mortality counts. This account, however, is problematic as
it relies solely on news reports that would likely consider-
ably underestimate the total mortality. This method does
not count indirect deaths, such as increased chronic ill-
ness due to the war, or deaths that are not publicly
reported. More recently, the media has relied on Iraq Min-
istry of Health reports that estimate 75–100 deaths per
day, and a cause-specific mortality rate due to violence of
1.01 to 1.34 per 1,000 per year [32]. This report, based on
total daily deaths/body counts from hospitals across Iraq
and the Baghdad morgue, is likely to provide a more accu-
rate estimate than the IBC, but would similarly not iden-
tify indirect deaths or deaths not reported to the health
facility [36]. There is the potential that this report may
overestimate the early war death toll because it extrapo-
lates current daily death rates to produce a death total and
mortality rates have steadily increased during the most
recent months. However, like other passive reporting
studies it would again underestimate the total mortality
by not capturing unreported and indirect deaths. The util-
ity of such collection data serves strictly as a 'sentinel case'
alert that should prompt further population-based cluster
sampling before such findings are widely disseminated or
quoted as fact.
There have been ongoing discussions and disagreements
regarding the most reliable figures derived from these
studies, including extensive deconstruction of the meth-
odological merits of each [39,40]. It is well known that
collecting mortality data during times of protracted vio-
lence faces inherent challenges of investigator, partici-
pant, and data security. The People's Kifah study
exemplifies the dangers involved in data collection related
to conflict settings, as they reported that the study was ter-
minated due to the kidnapping of a data collector.
There are several strengths and limitations to consider in
interpreting this review. Strengths include the extensive
searching and identification of studies that met our inclu-
sion criteria. Other reviews and websites summarizing
Iraq war deaths have also reported on estimates produced
by the NGO Coordinating Committee [27]. This estimate
has, however, never been made public and sources citing
it have had difficulty confirming its existence. We were
successful in communicating with the Coordinating Com-
mittee and they have verified that this data does not exist
(Cedric Turlan, personal communication, Dec 2006). We
attempted to communicate with the authors of all pub-
lished population-based studies.
There are also several limitations to consider in this
review. As this topic is highly politicized, it is possible that
mortality studies exist but have not been made publicly
available. Indeed, as we found with the Iraqiyun and Peo-
ple's Kifah studies – both whose study results have been
reported in the media but where the primary research is
unpublished – there is reason to believe that further mor-
tality estimates may exist. Ascertaining the reason for
death is a somewhat specious endeavourer as participant
recall and interpretation inevitably influences their
reported reasons for death. While we would expect violent
mortality to be more clearly understood than infectious
diseases, for example, we recognize that the same victims
affected by violent injuries may also die from diseases that
are pre-existing or acquired.
Our denominator for calculating mortality rates is based
on the United Nations Development Program/Iraq Minis-
try of Planning and Development Cooperation estima-
tions for 2004. It is possible that this estimate is slightly
misleading as we would expect some further population
displacement since 2004, through either immigration or
internal displacement. Finally, we aimed to review the
methodological quality of the included studies. Although
these quality indicators are based on consensus, there is a
general lack of empirical data to guide recommendations
of minimum reporting of methods and results [41]. It is
possible that other methodological items may be more
important and we plan to further address these issues in
upcoming work.
It has yet to be determined how long the sectarian vio-
lence in Iraq will continue and what the impact will be in
terms of total mortality. The results of this systematic
review demonstrate that there are immensely different
mortality estimates. However, the volume of studies pro-
duced also indicates that the international community is
attentively watching events unfolding in Iraq. The studies
and reports show that, despite varying estimates, large
numbers citizens in Iraq are still dying as a result of the
war. With the growing body of data, politicians and policy
makers are remiss to ignore the evidence and make policy
decisions that do not consider the health, safety, security
and rights of the citizens they claim to protect.
Conclusion
Despite the variance in estimates it is clear that the Iraq
war has exacted a large human cost. However, the variance
in estimates and their influence in policy and public opin-
ion underlines the importance for critical appraisal tools
and guidelines to be established to ascertain the strength
of inferences provided through each methodology. Efforts
should also be made to ensure studies are being con-
ducted in other conflict zones to provide real time feed-
back on the impact of current policies [42]. A
recommendation made by UNHCR in 2001, that a regu-
latory committee exist to interpret complex emergency
data and humanitarian data, is clearly desperately needed,Page 10 of 13
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responses [42]. Finally, the media should be educated on
the different types of studies so as to explain to the public
why mortality estimates vary and be able to comment
accurately on study estimates, strengths and weaknesses.
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Appendix 1: Quality considerations for 
retrospective surveys
Coverage: Was the population sampled sufficiently rep-
resentative of the underlying population affected by the
conflict?
This question determines whether the households or set-
tings visited appropriately represent populations affected
by the conflict.
Bias: Was the population sampled to avoid bias?
As some populations will be more, or less, affected by the
conflict, study investigators should make efforts to reduce
bias in sampling the population. The most common man-
ner to reduce bias is random selection of participating
households.
COMPLETENESS: Is the response rate reported?
The response rate provides inferences on how likely the
population sampled may represent the overall popula-
tion. Is there reason to believe that those that did not
respond are systematically different than those that did
respond?
ACCURACY: Were efforts made to confirm deaths?
Did the study investigators aim to confirm deaths through
corresponding evidence, eg. Death certificates.
Was a sample of households revisited to confirm find-
ings?
Did the study investigators revisit a random sample of
study households or settings to re-inquire about deaths
and did they find the same results?
Appendix 2: Common features of mortality 
study methodologies
Population-based mortality studies
Population-based studies, when conducted well, provide
strong inferences regarding the impact of a long-term con-
flict upon a large population. Time periods over which
events take place are of prime importance in population-
based case finding. Population-based case finding based
on survey estimation consists of drawing a representative
sample of households, and, based on a questionnaire,
eliciting information about the demographic evolution of
household members over a specified retrospective period;
mortality rates are estimated based on deaths reported in
the sample over the recall period, and total person-time of
exposure sampled (roughly equivalent to the number of
individuals included in the sample times the recall
period); confidence intervals are presented alongside
point estimates. Population-based case finding can also
be performed through prospective surveillance, whereby
investigators collect community-based data on deaths on
an ongoing basis. Accuracy of estimates from surveys
depend on the representativeness of sampling and accu-
racy of reports from respondents. Efforts are required to
ensure the specificity of causes of death and the reliability
of death occurring with the specific time period. As with
all studies, use of a control-group strengthens the infer-
ences regarding how likely the outcomes are due to
chance alone. One may wish to compare mortality rates
among the target population with mortality rates from a
nearby population, or from a geographically distinct pop-
ulation. Difficulties arise in choosing a control group, as
populations affected by conflict may be systematically dif-
ferent from a population that is not affected by conflict,
for reasons such as ethnicity, political representation and
geographic location, among others. For that reason,
choosing a control group risks having a spuriously unrep-
resentative control and other options must be sought.
One option is to consider using the same population (as
own control) as a pre and post exposure population.
Although self-controls are a weak design in therapeutic
research, when used with caution, they can present com-
pelling inferences in epidemiological surveys. While the
methodology for evaluating mortality are still in develop-
ment, some recent examples of retrospective surveys exist
for major conflicts including Iraq, Darfur and DRC
[16,42,43].
Passive reporting mortality studies
These studies involve monitoring trends in real-time and
requires continuous surveillance of deaths as they occur in
a region and is ideal for prompting a quick response. This
is generally considered to be a passive system of reporting
deaths as the death or body must reach the point of meas-
urement, eg. a hospital or morgue. Team members, usu-
ally local community members, are each assigned an areaPage 11 of 13
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mation from facilities regularly, such as weekly or even
daily, or they may wait for deaths to be reported to them.
Mortality rates are calculated by dividing the total number
of deaths in a period divided by the total population at
risk in the region and the period of analysis.
Passive reporting studies should be interpreted as 'sentinel
data' that provides strong inferences about the likelihood
of atrocities or violence. This data collection should then
be confirmed with population-based case finding to deter-
mine the magnitude of the issue. Passive reporting will
generally under-report death rates, particularly when
access is restricted or events are intentionally hidden.
Alternatively, they could also over-report events, if there is
a political reason to make exaggerated claims. Passive
reporting systems have, in the past, under-reported deaths
by as much as 10-fold, when compared to retrospective
population-based surveys [44]. If passive reports are used,
then it is necessary to use independent methods to assess
the reliability of reporting. These may include on-going
active surveillance, auditing by independent evaluation
groups, or triangulation with other geographic regions
also affected by violence.
Population-based and passive methods often go together
and help generate a more complete picture of mortality
trends over time. In this context, surveys are defined as
assessments of specific populations at specific time
points, whereas surveillance refers to ongoing assessment
and interpretation of health data to inform policy [45].
Both types of methods have their advantages and disad-
vantages and so deciding which method to employ
depends on several factors including length of recall
period, whether the population size is known, and the
types of resources available.
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